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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to improve understanding about how district health managers perceive 
and use their decision space for human resource management (HRM) and how this compares 
with national policies and regulatory frameworks governing HRM. The study builds upon work 
undertaken by PERFORM Research Consortium in Uganda using action-research to strengthen 
human resources management in the health sector. To assess the decision space that managers 
have in six areas of HRM (e.g. policy, planning, remuneration and incentives, performance 
management, education and information) the study compares the roles allocated by Uganda’s 
policy and regulatory frameworks with the actual room for decision-making that district health 
managers perceive that they have. Results show that in some areas District Health Management 
Team (DHMT) members make decisions beyond their conferred authority while in others they 
do not use all the space allocated by policy. DHMT members operate close to the boundaries 
defined by public policy in planning, remuneration and incentives, policy and performance 
management. However, they make decisions beyond their conferred authority in the area of 
information and do not use all the space allocated by policy in the area of education. DHMTs’ 
decision-making capacity to manage their workforce is influenced by their own perceived 
authority and sometimes it is constrained by decisions made at higher levels. We can conclude 
that decentralisation, to improve workforce performance, needs to devolve power further down 
from district authorities onto district health managers. DHMTs need more power and authority 
to make decisions about their workforce, but also more control over resources to be able to 




Health sector performance depends largely on its workforce (Cometto & Campbell 2016; 
Pierantoni & Garcia 2011; Witter et al. 2016). In decentralized settings, performance 
management of the workforce depends on the extent of power allotted to local authorities. In 
most Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs), District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) 
are assigned a range of responsibilities for managing workforce performance (Kolehmainen-
Aitken 2004).  
In his definition, Bossert (1998) refers to decision space as the range of choices allowed by the 
central level that local managers have in decentralized environments (Bossert 1998). These 
choices are often defined by laws and regulations (Bossert & Beauvais 2002). From this 
perspective, decentralization has two faces, the one provided in the formal provisions of the 
laws and regulations (“de jure”) and the operational one that arises from the constructed 
realities of local managers in a particular context (“de facto”) (Bossert & Mitchell 2011).  
Decentralization involves organizational changes which affect human resources for health (HRH) 
and overall health workforce performance (Bonenberger et al. 2014; Franco et al. 2002; 
Kolehmainen-Aitken 1998; Kolehmainen-Aitken 2004).  Although local managers in 
decentralized health systems may see their decision space expanded (Bonenberger et al. 2014), 
in practice, there are constraints to effectively using this decision space (Exworthy & Frosini 
2008; Seshadri et al. 2016). In LMICs, while local managers wish to adjust their workforce 
composition and skill-mix to meet the demands at the local level (Solter 1999), decisions made 
at the national level,  such as wage bill allocation or approval for new positions, often constrain 
their decision space. The degree of authority and decision-making power for human resource 
management (HRM) devolved to peripheral levels greatly depends on the decentralization 
strategy adopted by the country and on how it is implemented (Rondinelli & McCullough 1989). 
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Health sector reforms (HSR) that are focused on decentralization need to explore the extent to 
which the decision space at local levels has been used to enhance workforce performance. It is 
important then to understand how much of the decision space conferred “de jure” is actually 
available and used by local managers to make decisions in practice (“de facto”) taking into 
account other processes, institutions or regulations that have a bearing on the local decision-
making space (Bonenberger et al. 2016).  
Since 1986 Uganda has been gradually implementing decentralization policies through 
devolution of most government services, including health care provision, to the district level 
(Kivumbi et al. 2004). In line with the Constitution reform of 1995, the Local Government Act 
1997 formally defined the role of the central level agencies as including the supervision of Local 
Governments, policy formulation, standard-setting and quality assurance (Uganda Legal 
Information Institute 2016). District Local Councils (DLC) are headed by an elected Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO) who deals with the whole district administration. Members drawn 
from the DLC form the District Health Committee which is the political governing body of the 
health sector. Health care is headed by the Director of District Health Services (DDHS) assisted 
by the District Health Management Team (DHMT) which comprises technical officers in charge 
of the different areas. The DDHS reports to the CAO (Jeppsson 2004). 
Within the health sector in Uganda, the degree of devolution of essential functions to district 
level is considered high as compared to decentralization reforms in other countries. While some 
areas such as health facility management or community participation are considered to have a 
narrow local decision space, other important areas such as decisions about sources of revenue, 
expenditure, user fees or contracting-out services to private providers have a much stronger 
reliance on local decision power than in other countries (Bossert & Beauvais 2002).  
There are gaps in the evidence base with respect to the utilisation of decision space for HRM 
and its implications for health systems performance. For example, there is need for stronger 
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evidence on whether shifting decision-making powers from the central level to district 
authorities translates into more autonomy for DHMTs to manage their workforce, how health 
managers perceive and utilize decision space within different contexts, and how this process can 
be supported to improve workforce performance.  
This paper is based on the work that PERFORM, a research consortium comprising six academic 
institutions from Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, Switzerland and the UK (2), undertook from 2011 to 
2015. The PERFORM project focused on strengthening the leadership and management skills of 
district level managers applying a participatory cyclical Action Research process as a 
management strengthening intervention to facilitate the development and implementation of 
work plans to improve workforce performance. Specifically, this paper draws upon one key 
aspect of the initial situation analysis that is, the perceived decision-making space of the district 
managers. More information about the PERFORM project is available in the published literature 
(Mshelia et al. 2013; Mshelia et al. 2016) and on the PERFORM website 
(www.performconsortium.com). The aim of this paper is to improve understanding about how 
DHMTs perceive and use their decision space for HRM to improve health workforce performance 
in decentralised health systems. 
Methods 
This paper draws upon data gathered and analysed using multiple methods (Green & Thorogood 
2004). Its case study approach allows for an in-depth exploration of the context in which the 
phenomenon under study occurs (Yin 2009) and the behaviours of and relationships among 
actors and agencies influencing the decision space of managers (Gilson 2012). To identify the 
effective decision space that members of the DHMT have in HRM, a comparison between what 
Ugandan public administration provides (“de jure”) and what managers actually do (“de facto”) 
was undertaken. The purpose was to get a deeper understanding of the DHMT’s perceptions 
about their authority to act and to reflect on their actual management practice in six areas of 
HRM. These six areas were adapted from a tool used to assess decentralization of health services 
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in Africa in another study (Sunderbrink et al. 2003). The six areas are 1) HR policy formulation, 
implementation and monitoring (policy); 2) HR planning, forecasting, defining job descriptions, 
recruitment and dismissal, recruiting additional staff and posting (planning); 3) setting 
remuneration and incentives (remuneration and incentives); 4) performance management and 
supervision (performance); 5) continuing education and training (education); and 6) HR 
information (information).  
1. Assessment of the “de jure” decision space: Uganda public administration and policy 
documentary review 
To define the “de jure” HRM responsibilities of DHMTs, a review of Uganda’s public 
administration and policy documents focussing on the six HRM areas was conducted. The 
results were extracted, tabulated and classified using three levels: decisions made at the 
central level (e.g. Ministry of Health or Civil Service Commission/Health Service Commission); 
decisions made at district level but not by the DHMT (District Service Commission or Chief 
Administrative Officer); and decisions made by the DHMT which has full responsibility for a 
specific area or function. 
2. Assessment of the “de facto” decision space: managers’ self-assessment 
To understand the “de facto” decision space, a self-assessment by DHMT members was 
conducted during the situation analysis phase of the project. Self-assessment has been 
routinely used to appraise the competency of human resources managers (Yammarino & 
Atwater 1997). The six HRM areas identified were used as the framework for this assessment. 
Two dimensions within the “de facto” decision space were assessed: perceived authority and 
reported actual practice in HRM. While the methods used to assess each element are 
described separately here, results are presented here in an integrated way. 
2.1 DHMT self-assessment of perceived authority in human resource management 
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In each district, DHMTs selected three members to carry out this assessment. They 
were not given any specific criteria for this selection. The selected members completed 
a questionnaire. The questionnaire was developed by adapting a tool focusing on the 
six key HRM areas (Sunderbrink et al. 2003). They scored their perceptions about the 
level of authority they have in each area by selecting “no authority”, “some authority” 
or “full authority”. This information was compiled in a spreadsheet to allow for intra-
district, cross-district and overall comparison with the “de jure” decision space. In 
addition, participants provided some brief comments to each score, which were 
included in the analysis. 
2.2 DHMT self-assessment of reported actual practice in HRM 
To allow for a better understanding of the DHMT members’ actual practice a focus 
group discussion (FGD) with the same members who completed the self-assessment 
questionnaire was carried out in each district (total 3 FGDs). The researchers used the 
six HRM areas identified to guide the exploration of their actual practices in HRM. 
Participants were first asked if they carried out each function answering “yes fully”, 
“yes partially” or “no” and then to provide explanations about the processes involved 
in each area, the consequences or the impact of carrying out these functions on the 
performance of their respective workforces and any reflections they wanted to add. 
We were not seeking for consensus across the groups, but encouraged participants to 
openly discuss and reflect upon their actual practice. However, they tended to provide 
similar responses. Any differences were noted in the results section. The discussions 
were digitally recorded following consent by each participant. The recordings were 
transcribed verbatim and the transcripts analysed  using the framework approach 
(Richie & Spencer 1994) against the six HRM areas. 
For the purpose of this paper and to facilitate overall comparison, all the results were re-coded 
as 1, 2 and 3 (1 assigned to the lowest and 3 the highest score for “perceived authority” and 
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“perceived level of practice”). Where different functions were analysed within one area, an 
average was calculated for that area. The three assessments were compiled into a spreadsheet 
to analyse the different decision spaces defined by the responses to the two self-assessments 
and by the policy/regulation documentary review (see scoring tables as Supplementary Annexes 
1, 2 and 3). Having found that scores for perceived authority and reported actual practice fully 
coincided it was decided to use only one score for the “de facto” results to facilitate its 
visualization in a radar-chart. 
Ethical clearance for this research was obtained from the Ethics Committees at both Liverpool 
School of Tropical Medicine (Ref. 12.09) and Makerere University School of Public Health (Ref. 
162/SS2851.). All participants signed a written consent form before their interviews after having 
been thoroughly informed about the research. Data were managed, stored, analysed and 
presented ensuring full confidentiality.  
Results 
The results are presented against the six HRM areas. We first visually present DHMT’s decision 
making space for HRM using a radar-chart including the “de jure” and the “de facto” decision 
spaces (see Figure 1). The six HRM areas are then presented in more detail using data from the 
“de jure” decision space documentary review and the managers’ self-assessment. A summary of 
these findings is presented in Table 1. 
The scores generated from the perceptions of decision space and reported actual practices of 
DHMTs members were the same, which suggests that managers make use of all the decision 
space they perceive to have. However, when comparing both with the “de jure” decision space 
there are some differences. There are three areas (e.g. Policy, Planning, and Performance) 
where managers seem to make decisions close to the “de jure” decision space boundaries. 
Regarding Information and Remuneration and Incentives, managers seem to make decisions 
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beyond their “de jure” space while in the Education area they seem not to use all the “de jure” 
decision space available. Inter-district variability was found to be negligible in all areas. 
Figure 1 here 
Table 1 here 
1. Health workforce policy formulation, implementation and monitoring  
HR policies arise mainly from several central level agencies. Ministry of Public Service is 
responsible for developing, managing and administering HR policies, management systems and 
procedures and the structure of the Public Service (Government of Uganda 2016b). 
Responsibility for HR policy dissemination and implementation is devolved to district authorities 
through the District Service Commissions (Government of Uganda 2016a). The role of DHMTs in 
this area as defined by policy is limited to oversight of the implementation of national policies 
with some rather marginal space for adaptation of these national decisions to the local context 
(Ministry of Health 2011b). This was confirmed by the results of the self-assessment in which 
members of the DHMT perceived having very limited authority for HR policy formulation with a 
relatively wider space for implementation and monitoring. Their contribution is reported to be 
limited to the involvement of district, sub-district and community representatives at some 
stages of the policy-making process (mainly through consultations) and to adapt, enforce and 
monitor the implementation of these policies. Sometimes there are some discrepancies 
between what is stated in the policy and what is implemented. For example, HR policy assigns 
Health Centre Level IV management functions to a senior medical officer. However, the shortage 
of medical staff makes task-shifting necessary, where lower ranking staff are requested to 
assume these functions.  
2. Health workforce planning, forecasting, defining job descriptions, recruitment and dismissal, 
recruiting additional staff and posting  
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The Local Governments Act 1997 (Uganda Legal Information Institute 2016) assigns recruitment 
powers to the District Service Commission (DSC) which is also responsible for appointing, 
promoting, retiring and disciplining health workers (Ministry of Health 2006). The responsibility 
of forecasting staff needs at district level lies with the District Service Commission which works 
closely with the DHMT to assess the expected needs. Job descriptions are centrally developed 
by the Ministry of Public Service (Ministry of Public Service 2011) and the Health Service 
Commission (Health Service Commission 2005).  
Overall, perceived authority in this area is relatively high. However, there is variability between 
the specific planning functions. Forecasting HRH needs is perceived to be an important function 
of the DHMTs. DHMT members identify staffing requirements against the national approved 
positions (e.g. establishment) and pass that information to the district authorities. However, 
often that information doesn’t translate into new positions as financial constraints limit the 
capacity of the district or the central service commissions to authorize them. In addition, all new 
positions need to be sanctioned by the Ministry of Public Service and authorized by the Ministry 
of Finance.  
“We submit [staffing needs] to the HR department of the district and also to the MoH as part 
of the area we cover for planning every year. We submit the HR plan as well… [ ] …we follow 
up, but the usual answer is that -that’s what the wage bill was allocated- so, that is the reason 
why you have not seen any change as we do not have any resources to improve on the wage 
bill for the district…” (DHMT member Self-assessment FGD) 
The space perceived by managers to develop job descriptions is relatively narrow. While 
standard job descriptions are developed at the central level (Health Service Commission 2005), 
DHMTs sometimes adapt them by adding extra functions to meet their specific needs.  
Similarly, DHMTs reported having a narrow space to make decisions about recruitment. Their 
role is limited to sitting on the recruitment panels which suggests that they have some space to 
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influence decisions. In regard to disciplinary issues there is a committee within the DHMT that 
investigates cases of misconduct and forwards their recommendations to the DSC. However, in 
one of the districts, members of the DHMT interviewed were sceptical about their authority to 
make decisions in this area: 
“…much as it may look like we have an input, but in the real life the final decision is not 
dependent on what DHMT thinks.” (DHMT member Self-assessment FGD) 
DHMTs reported that they are not allowed to recruit additional staff. District Local Councils can 
mobilize resources locally but their priorities often do not target new health workers which is 
perceived by members of the DHMT as being politically driven rather than responding to the 
actual needs of the district: 
“You know? the political wing will always put resources where they can easily be accounted 
for in the public eye, if you say I constructed a health centre, every person who passes can see 
but if you say I constructed [recruited] that health worker, nobody will see it.” (DHMT member 
Self-assessment FGD) 
The DHMT has full authority to post and transfer staff between health facilities within the 
district. However, some managers suggested that nepotism at higher levels sometimes 
undermines their decisions in this regard: 
“…sometimes they may identify a gap at health facility X but if the recruited staff is related to 
any of the bosses in the district then they want you to post this person at a particular facility 
not necessarily where you had a gap.” (DHMT member Self-assessment FGD) 
In general, this wide decision space for posting helps DHMTs to improve overall workforce 
performance but also it gives them the power to use transfers as a reward or sanction for good 
or poor performers respectively. 
3. Remuneration and incentives 
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Different institutions are involved in remuneration and incentives policy development and 
implementation. The Ministry of Public Service (MoPS) develops policy on wages and salaries 
and approves the wage bill (Ministry of Public Service 2010). The Ministry of Health (MoH) 
approves staff establishment ceilings, provides detailed wage bill allocation to districts according 
to the establishment and ensures districts comply with allocated ceilings. The Ministry of 
Finance, based on the wage bill approved by MoPS, finalises the wage bill budget allocation and 
ensure funds availability for salary payments (Ministry of Health 2011a). We could not find any 
mention of DHMT’s role in salary and incentives setting in the documents reviewed suggesting 
a narrow “de jure” decision space in this area. Consistent with this, all participants perceived not 
having any decision space to set salaries.  
“…the salaries are paid by the centre, by public service, that is at the national level, so for us 
we don’t have any control.” (DHMT member Self-assessment FGD) 
Regarding financial incentives all districts expressed their difficulties in getting funding for this 
purpose. In one district they expressed frustration about other districts being able to provide 
top-ups for doctors which, in the context of competition among districts created by 
decentralization, may leave them behind in capacity to retain greatly needed cadres. Financial 
constraints have further implications concerning incentives. It was reported that in cases where 
there are several good-performers and there are not enough means to reward all of them, those 
who do not get rewards may feel in a comparative disadvantage and may lose motivation which 
in turn may negatively affect their performance and retention. 
“Some of those people who have done very well and the system has recognized them are 
happy with the opportunities that come their way, of course the system cannot recognize 
everybody, those who have not been recognized and yet their contribution is high, of course 
they don’t feel well.” (DHMT member Self-assessment FGD) 
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Development partners sometimes pay salaries for additional staff recruited for their sponsored 
programmes. In one of the districts one partner was supporting salaries for 22 additional staff. 
“I came on a contract with xxxx [development partner]. xxxx is the one supporting us, paying 
our salaries, but it is working together with the district.” (DHMT member Self-assessment 
FGD) 
DHMTs perceived having a wide space to decide about non-monetary incentives and in fact they 
all reported introducing access to training or recognition awards to retain best workers in the 
district: 
“Of course we do supervisions, you find a health facility performing well, the first incentive is 
the word “thank you” itself that you have reached at my place of work and you say that I am 
doing a good job, the other incentive is that when you find somebody is performing very well, 
if there is a workshop, he is invited to go to attend… [] …we were looking at individuals, at 
health facilities how they have performed and we would give them certificates and gifts to 
say thank you; that is the farthest we could go.” (DHMT member Self-assessment FGD)  
4. Performance management and supervision 
The Health Sector Strategic Plan III 2010/11 - 2014/15 (Ministry of Health 2011b), suggests that 
DHMTs have full authority to manage the performance of their workers. Appraising staff on 
annual basis is mandatory as per policy from the Ministry of Public Service. This Ministry 
produces guidelines and tools for staff appraisal in all sectors with the Health Service 
Commission adapting them to the health sector (Health Service Commission 2005). 
All DHMTs perceived having full authority to appraise and supervise their staff. Workers’ 
appraisal against agreed annual objectives is normally undertaken by the immediate line 
manager each year. Interviewees also mentioned that, unlike senior staff, frontline workers are 
sometimes reluctant to be appraised as they do not see the benefits of it. 
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Facilities are meant to be supervised on a quarterly basis by the DHMTs. Some of the barriers 
expressed by DHMT members to conduct supervisions include lack of resources like transport. 
However, DHMTs reported that development partners facilitated transport for their specific 
activities which was used by DHMTs to undertake supervision. The limited time allocated to 
supervision was mentioned as a reason for sometimes not thoroughly analysing issues identified 
and acting on them. 
5. Continuing education and training 
Continuing Professional Development (CPD) of health workers at district level is under the 
responsibility of the National Steering Committee for CPD at MoH through a CPD district 
coordinator (Ministry of Health 2006). District health managers, in line with the terms of the 
Second National Health Policy 2010 have the responsibility of ensuring appropriate professional 
development of their workers (Ministry of Health 2010). 
DHMTs perceived having some or full authority to decide about organization of CPD activities. 
However, they all reported having little or no power to finance these activities unless these are 
included in the annual work plans agreed with district authorities. Despite some funding being 
allocated at district level for CPD and the fact that the District Local Council assesses periodically 
the needs for training, results of these assessments are rarely used for effectively deliver in-
service training for health workers. This was reported to be sometimes caused by 
mismanagement or corruption: 
 “As a DHMT, we don’t have capacity to fund any course here but the district [government] is 
supposed to have the career development plan which has money that is supposed to be 
shared across departments like education, production, but that money has not been 
streamlined properly” (DHMT member Self-assessment FGD) 
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In all districts, development partners play an important role in developing capacity for the 
specific programmes they sponsor. 
6. Human resources information 
While there is mention in the HRH policy 2006 (Ministry of Health 2006) of the importance of 
strengthening the HR information system (HRIS), it does not identify specific functions or areas 
in which DHMTs should make decisions. The National Health Policy 2010 (Ministry of Health 
2010) encourages analysis and use of information for decision-making at all levels. 
All managers perceived to have full authority in maintaining the HRIS. Health workers’ personal 
files, including employment history, experience and skills acquired during training, are kept and 
maintained by the DHMT’s office. Members of the DHMT perceived having a relatively wide 
decision space to generate and use health workforce information, particularly after the recent 
digitalization of the HRIS. This is perceived by managers as an important development which 
allows them to forecast HRH needs more accurately than when they had to rely on paper-based 
systems.  
Discussion 
We have seen that district health managers’ decision space for HRM is influenced by multiple 
factors. Policy and regulatory frameworks define the “de jure” space. However, the “de jure” 
decision space alone does not necessarily define the actual (“de facto”) decision space. In fact, 
perceived decision space, when narrower than the “de jure” decision space, may limit decision-
making of local managers as occurred in the Education area. Similarly, when managers perceived 
to have more space than that defined “de jure”, they made decisions, as happened in the 
Information area. Moreover, the fact that scores for perceived space (e.g. questionnaire) and 
those obtained from the assessment of the reported actual decision-making practice (e.g. focus 
group discussions) coincided, suggests that managers use all the space they perceive to have. 
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Hence managers’ perception of the degree of decision space available (which may be different 
to that dictated by policy or regulatory frameworks) is critical to understanding how action is 
taken or not taken.  
This study has shown that issues in other components of the health system beyond the 
workforce such as financial constraints, lack of material resources or administrative hurdles and 
other areas of influence such as local politics, all affect DHMT’s ability to make and implement 
their own decisions about the workforce. In this regard the role that development partners play 
in supporting the health workforce was found to be relatively limited to payment of salaries for 
additional staff, providing logistic support for supervisions and providing capacity building for 
their specific programmes. District health managers operate within organisations that are in 
essence complex adaptive systems (Byrne & Callaghan 2014) in which different components 
interact and where changes in one component affect other components of the system 
(Agyepong et al. 2012; Plsek & Greenhalgh 2001). Consequently, in order to address health 
workforce issues, a holistic approach to HRM and understanding the relationship between 
different health system components, which implies a broad systems approach, is required 
beyond the specific technical workforce aspects (De Savigny & Adam 2009). 
Managerial decentralization represents an essential element of the health sector reform agenda 
(Cassels 1995; Gilson & Mills 1995; Seshadri et al. 2016). In theory, devolving authority to local 
health managers is meant to improve allocative and technical efficiency, equity, responsiveness 
to local needs and quality of services (World Bank 1993).  This study, in line with what was found 
in Ghana and Zambia (Bossert & Beauvais 2002; Kwamie et al. 2016), showed that, while some 
HRM decisions such as recruitment, appointment or promotion are indeed decentralized in 
Uganda, they are only devolved to the district government rather than to the DHMT which is the 
final HRM decision-maker. District governments deal with all public sectors and health may not 
always be a priority for them (Nannyonjo & Okoti 2013). Also the political nature of 
decentralization has its reflection at the local level as decisions often rely on elected district 
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authorities who are under the influence of political patronage (Green 2010). The rewards for 
good performance as well as sanctions are hard to operationalize. For example, staff promotions 
for those deserving this reward are usually unavailable due to wage bill controls at the central 
level. In addition, managers suggested that despite some HRM functions being officially 
decentralized, corruption and mismanagement were affecting the effectiveness of their 
decisions in HRM as reported when speaking about funding available for capacity building not 
being translated into actual training activities. In general, we have seen how health managers at 
district level have limited power to make decisions about their workforce which undermines the 
rhetoric about the benefits of managerial decentralization. 
One of the strengths of this study is based on its multi methods approach (Green & Thorogood 
2004). While questionnaires provided a tool to quantify managers’ perceptions about their 
decision space, the analysis of data generated through FGDs allowed for a more in-depth 
analysis of these perceptions. In this regard triangulation of results has contributed to 
strengthen the robustness of our findings. 
This study took place in three districts out of 112 (at the time) which may limit the 
generalisability of results across Uganda. However, the low inter-district variability in terms of 
perceived and factual decision space found suggests a similar situation across districts in the 
country. We have tried to provide sufficient details of the policy and regulatory context and 
management structures and relationships within districts in order to support lessons learning 
and transferability to contexts beyond Uganda.  
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that decentralization, to fully achieve its objectives in regard to 
strengthening health workforce management, needs to shift power further down from district 
government and capitalise more on the management potential of district health managers. 
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DHMTs need more power and authority to make decisions with respect to their workforce, and 
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